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ABSTRACT
“Unintended consequences” is an umbrella concept. It comprises
phenomena that diﬀer in crucial respects and consequently, with-
out reﬁnement, it remains a rather blunt instrument for policy
analysis. The contributions in this volume, however, show that
disentangling unintended consequences by making clear distinc-
tions between various types, makes the concept much more useful
for policy analysis. Assessing the impact of EU foreign policies as
studied in this volume, we show that “bonuses”, “windfalls”, “acci-
dents”, and “trade-oﬀs” – all unintended – are very diﬀerent when
it comes to the explanation of policy outcomes, or to allocating
responsibility for them.
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In The Honourable Schoolboy, John le Carré has Martello, a CIA colleague of British
master spy George Smiley, explain an unwelcome development in the case at hand. “So
here it is,” says Martello, “[h]ere’s where you get your human error, right? It could be
worse but not much. In our game there’s two views of history: conspiracy and fuck up.
Here’s where we get the fuck up, no question at all” (le Carré 1978, 276). In our game,
as social scientists, we use diﬀerent terms, but we are basically doing the same thing.
Many of us specialise in the study of “unwelcome developments” which we explain
either as intended by an actor − Martello’s “conspiracy” – or, in Merton’s terms, as an
unintended consequence of purposive action − that is, a “fuck up”. There is a further
parallel: Martello’s theory is counter-intuitive. He is convinced that they are dealing
with a fuck up, whereas in the intelligence world conspiracy is the norm. Invoking
unintended consequences, as social scientists do, is also often counter-intuitive.
Reference to unintended consequences is especially common in the study of formal
organisations, where purposive design, eﬃciency and rationality are the norm. That
formal organisations also produce unintended consequences and, in the process, some-
times defeat their own aims is also counter-intuitive.
Indeed, Robert K. Merton developed and applied his work on unanticipated con-
sequences especially in his critical studies of Weberian bureaucracy (e.g. Merton et al.
1952). His article “Bureaucratic Structure and Personality” (1940) conveys the basic
idea: “The chief merit of bureaucracy,” Merton summarizes Weber, “is its technical
eﬃciency, with a premium placed on precision, speed, expert control, continuity,
discretion, and optimal returns on input” (561). However, Merton continues, Weber’s
ideal type emphasizes the positive attainments of bureaucratic organisations while “the
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internal stresses and strains of such structures are almost wholly neglected” (Merton
1940, 561-562). A well-known example of such strains is what Merton calls “displace-
ment of goals”:
Adherence to the rules, originally conceived as a means, becomes transformed into an end
in itself; there occurs the familiar process of displacement of goals whereby ‘an instru-
mental value becomes a terminal value.’ Discipline, readily interpreted as conformance
with regulations, whatever the situation, is seen not as a measure designed for speciﬁc
purposes but becomes an immediate value in the life-organization of the bureaucrat. This
emphasis, resulting from the displacement of the original goals, develops into rigidities and
an inability to adjust readily. (563)
We quote Merton at length to emphasize an important quality of this Special Issue: the
studies on unintended consequences of EU external action collected here re-establish
a classic theoretical approach in a relatively new empirical ﬁeld. As Burlyuk and
Noutcheva write in the Introduction, “As a dense institutional environment, the EU
may be particularly prone to errors and misjudgements linked to the very nature of its
bureaucracy” (10), and several contributions in this volume suggest that this is true (e.g.
Dandashly and Noutcheva; Kourtelis1). Moreover, Merton’s critique of the one-
dimensional focus on rational eﬃciency in the Weberian approach to bureaucracy
connects well with Burlyuk and Noutcheva’s critique of mainstream literature on EU
external performance. Mainstream literature evaluates EU external performance “in
terms of success or failure to achieve the intended eﬀects”, and consequently often
presents EU external engagement as having either a “positive impact or no impact”
(Burlyuk and Noutcheva, 1). This critique underlies the present volume, and it leads
contributors to focus on unintended consequences, as Merton and his students did
earlier.2
One conclusion from the empirical studies collected in this volume is that the EU
cannot prevent the emergence of unwelcome unintended consequences of its pur-
posive policies. In this respect, what happens to the EU does not diﬀer from what
sociologists ever since Merton have shown to be true for national states and, for that
matter, any large organisation (e.g. Elias 1982; Giddens 1977; Hirschman 1991;
Lindblom 1959; Salminen 2011). Clearly the “positive-impact-or-no-impact” culture
in EU studies has to become more inclusive − there is negative impact too, albeit
often unintended. This volume contains a range of instructive examples.
Moreover, the Special Issue introduces a complex taxonomy related to the
concept of unintended consequences. It is summarised in the Introduction and
consistently built upon in all subsequent contributions. In our view, however, the
key distinction made in this issue lies in the presence or absence of anticipation.
The articles here do not just map out unintended consequences of EU external
action; they also address the crucial question to what extent the unintended
consequences at issue were also unanticipated. This is a key contribution; it
refreshes both the literature on EU external action and the social theory on
unintended consequences.
1When the reference is without a date, it is to an article contained in this Special Issue.
2Merton’s students prolonged and expanded this research agenda and founded a school of critical bureaucracy studies
(Blau 1955; Gouldner 1954; Selznick 1953).
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Unravelling unintended consequences
All the articles in this volume consistently distinguish unintended from unanticipated
consequences. Ever since the 1970s, it has become increasingly common in the social
sciences to replace the term “unanticipated consequences”, as coined by Merton in
1936, with its putative synonym “unintended consequences”. The latter term has won
the day and “unanticipated consequences” is disappearing from the literature (de
Zwart 2015, 285). Yet, this conﬂation of terms, however convenient linguistically,
obscures the role of actors in producing certain consequences which hinders explana-
tion and the allocation of responsibility. What was unanticipated must have come
about because of error, ignorance, ideological blindness or, if you also account for
welcome unintended consequences, luck (D in Table 1, cf. Merton 1936). What was
unintended may also, however, result from purposive choice. That is, its occurrence
may have been anticipated but it was nevertheless permitted (B in Table 1). The
diﬀerence is crucial.
Unintended consequences is an umbrella category and if we do not diﬀerentiate
between the very diﬀerent phenomena it contains, its usefulness for the analysis and
practice of policymaking is limited. Table 1 shows a basic distinction used in this
volume: unintended consequences can be either anticipated or not. Unlike the conven-
tional category of unintended consequences (D), category B invokes agency and
purposive choice. Unintended and anticipated consequences occur because somebody
permitted them. The consequences under D, by contrast, occur accidentally since they
were not foreseen. They result from action but not from design, to paraphrase Adam
Fergusson (1995 [1793]). Category D consequences are well known and recognised
among policymakers as principally unavoidable. There will always be unforeseen con-
sequences, be they windfalls or accidents. Category B, however, entails politics and
ethics, especially when it concerns unwelcome, harmful consequences. Harm that
results from a policy decision may be unintended, but if it was anticipated and still
permitted, a trade-oﬀ was made (Table 2).3
If the concept of unintended consequences is used in its umbrella form, diﬀerences
between trade-oﬀs and accidents or between windfalls and bonuses are easily ignored. As
far as welcome consequences are concerned, Merton (1936, 897) already cautions about
policymakers who try to turn windfalls into bonuses. With unwelcome consequences, we
Table 1. Consequences of purposive action
Intended Unintended
Anticipated A B
Unanticipated D
Table 2. Types of unintended consequences
Unintended
Welcome Unwelcome
Anticipated bonus trade-oﬀ
Unanticipated windfall accident
3We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this further reﬁnement and the various names for these categories.
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should add, there is a danger that accidents are trade-oﬀs that are covered up in order to
diﬀuse responsibility.
Many contributions to this volume analyse trade-oﬀs and highlight the choices and
responsibilities that become relevant if and when unwelcome eﬀects are anticipated.
Natasja Reslow, for instance, points out the risk that unintended consequences of EU
external migration policy undermine its renowned ‘normative power’ in the interna-
tional system (38). In order to deal with migration pressures, the EU cooperates with
countries that have poor human rights records, such as Afghanistan, Libya, and Turkey,
endangering migrants’ lives and wellbeing. Unintended as it may be, this outcome has
so often been commented upon in the press and academic publications that we can
safely call it anticipated and unwelcome. In other words, it is not an accident but
a trade-oﬀ. Indeed, Reslow, following Burlyuk (2017), calls it “a case of wilfully ignoring
unintended consequences” (38).
Why would EU policymakers accept that their policies cause harm, risking, in the
process, to undermine the EU’s cherished normative power? Endangering migrants’
wellbeing is not intended of course; it results from a trade-oﬀ between control over
migration streams (through cooperation with the named regimes) and foreseeable harm
to individual migrants. Trade-oﬀs imply a choice between ‘the lesser of two evils’, but in
a political context such as EU foreign policy, what is considered ‘lesser’ or ‘more’
depends on risk assessment (e.g. Carbone in this volume) and creed. As De Ville and
Gheyle show, for instance, proponents of the TTIP intended to boost “growth, jobs, and
[set] global standards” (18). They anticipated unintended and unwelcome side eﬀects
such as threats to consumer health, environmental protection, and democracy, but
would have settled for those rather than have no TTIP at all. Opponents, on the other
hand, would have considered no TTIP the lesser of the two evils.
Researching intent and anticipation
The question of intent is at the core of this Special Issue. Without establishing intent
and thus focusing on actors, any discussion about unintended consequences becomes
moot. The authors in this volume take a clear stance in the ongoing debate between
structural or functional versus actor-centred explanations. This position inevitably leads
to discussions about ‘measurement’ – indeed methodology is an important issue in the
discussion of unintended consequences. For instance, we focus on the consequences of
purposive action. Occurrences that take place without purposive action fall outside our
scope. But, as Merton already suggested in 1936, in practice consequences emerge from
the interplay between action, context – “objective situation” (895) − and the conditions
of action. Intentions, therefore, cannot simply be inferred from documents and declara-
tions; they need to be carefully investigated.
The same is true for the “extent of anticipation” mentioned above. Merton cautions
against policymaker’s inclination to rationalise ex-post, claiming that unintended con-
sequences that turn out to be benign were intended in the ﬁrst place (1936, 897). The
opposite is also common: policymakers may have hidden agendas. Indeed, scholars of
EU external action are well acquainted with this because the EU has frequently been
accused of hypocrisy, of hiding particularistic interests behind a discourse of universal
values (Hyde-Price 2006; Smith 2006; Cusumano 2018). Moreover, when things turn
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out wrong, responsible decision-makers may stress that we are facing unintended
consequences because, since unintended connotes unanticipated, that obscures the
trade-oﬀs that were made. The reader will not ﬁnd good examples of such outcomes
in the articles presented here exactly because the authors have taken care not to confuse
unintended with lack of anticipation.
The editors of this Special Issue acknowledge in the Introduction the methodological
diﬃculties in establishing intent and anticipation. The case studies show that establish-
ing them requires intimate knowledge of contexts, procedures and documents, and
especially close observation of and extensive interviews with policymakers. De Ville and
Gheyle provide an instructive illustration of the diﬃculties involved and a good exam-
ple of how they can be overcome. Given earlier contestation of similar attempts and the
general context of protest and mobilisation against neoliberal economic policies, “the
level [of protest against TTIP negotiations] should not have come as completely
unanticipated to the European Commission” (20). But it did. Or at least, as the authors
put it, “although politicisation could have been anticipated . . . [it] was not expected”
(21). The reason, the authors note, might simply have been hope (given the low levels of
politicisation in previous years) in combination with an eagerness to proceed in light of
the prospect of the enormous rewards if the trade agreement were signed (21).
Reslow’s study provides another example of researching anticipation. She traces the
European Commission’s hidden agenda in establishing Mobility Partnerships. These
partnerships provided the Commission with insight into the member states’ policies on
legal migration. This was certainly not among the oﬃcial intended consequences of the
Partnerships, it was an unintended, anticipated and in fact welcome (by the
Commission) consequence. A somewhat similar methodological approach is present
in Carbone’s article, in which he analyses internal documents, impact assessments, and
a range of recommendations issued by the European Commission.
These and other examples show that analysing the various kinds of unintended
consequences deﬁned in this volume requires anthropological rather than statistical
research methods. The hopes, fears and expectations of decision-makers are usually not
documented in accessible ﬁles, but can be researched by participant observatory
techniques, in-depth interviews, and process-tracing.
Explaining unintended consequences
We invoke ignorance, error, or something in between such as ‘path dependency’ to
explain consequences of purposive action that are unintended and unforeseen. To
explain unintended but foreseen consequences we focus on actors. Negative eﬀects
that were foreseen have been permitted to occur. Risks are traded oﬀ against the
expected advantages of the intended eﬀect.4 The reasons for the trade-oﬀs are essential
for explaining the anticipated unintended consequences. The present volume contri-
butes to our knowledge of such reasons by charting organisational regularities that
stimulate the production of unintended but anticipated consequences.
4Hirshman (1991) argues that the expected and intended eﬀect tends to blind actors to possible negative side eﬀects,
and that this is the main reason why unintended consequences occur.
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The ﬁrst of such regularities links policymakers’ inclination to trade oﬀ consequences
to their attachment to core values. Merton already mentions this (Merton 1936, 903; see
also Burlyuk 2017, 1016), but we now have a broader literature on the socialisation of
EU oﬃcials and decision-makers into institutional substantive or behavioural norms,
which helps explain why foreseen and unwelcome consequences are nevertheless
permitted (cf. Bellier 2000; Chelotti 2015; Henökl 2015; Hooghe 2002; 2012; Kassim
et.al.; Juncos and Pomorska 2006; 2010; 2011; Lewis 2010). This issue enlarges our
knowledge on this. A clear example is the contribution of Dandashly and Noutcheva
who talk about “apolitical engagement” as part of an “internal culture” in the European
Commission and show how this culture has inﬂuenced the way in which the EU
engaged with the MENA region. One could argue that their argument is equally valid
for the Eastern neighbourhood. For instance, apolitical engagement seems to have been
the norm during the Orange Revolution or Maidan in Ukraine. The EU was very
reluctant to support opposition in Belarus or even to get involved at all politically
(beyond acting as a ‘broker’).
A whole set of core values − some of them clashing – appear in the article on TTIP
by De Ville and Gheyle. The European Commission’s norm of secrecy when conducting
international negotiations, for instance, clashed with the EU’s basic norm of transpar-
ency which led the Commission to change its procedure. Ideological support for
a neoliberal agenda clearly shaped the substance of the negotiations. As the authors
put it, “the Commission was willing to take the gamble, as the reward of an agreement
with the US was considered very high” (21). That is, they were prepared to let the
anticipated unwelcome consequence occur if they had to.
Another regularity that stimulates the production of unintended but anticipated
consequences seems to be the perceived urgency of a situation. The feeling that “we
have to do something” is a well-documented sentiment in the case of the Common
Security and Defence Policy, EU’s interventions beyond its borders, or the adoption of
sanctions. However, the urge does not originate only in external shocks or crises. It can
also come from interest groups, epistemic communities or advocacy coalitions that
provide oﬃcials with ideas about diﬀerent possible policy outcomes. In the literature on
interest representation and lobbying in the EU, still a relatively small ﬁeld in foreign
and security policy, the issue is discussed at length (e.g. Voltolini 2015; 2016; Joachim
and Dembinski 2012).
For example, the Arab revolts created urgent pressure on the EU to respond. The
contributions by Dandashly and Noutcheva, and Kourtelis analyse this. Kourtelis argues
that, in response to popular demands for democracy and growth in the MENA
countries, the EU created programs to support agricultural development. In eﬀect,
however, the unintended consequences of these programs undermined the EU’s own
goals, such as empowering small farmers and increasing its popularity in the region.
Dandashly and Noutcheva come up with a mixed picture. On the one hand, part of their
material shows unintended consequences resulting from choice: the EU prioritizes interests
over values and consequently supports consolidation of authoritarian regimes. The “empow-
ering of illiberal reform coalitions”, however, seemsmore unanticipated and unintended, and
thus not caused by choice but by bureaucratic pathologies such as “risk aversion, inertia,
strong internal culture of sectoral cooperation [and] apolitical engagement”.
Some of these factors match well with Merton’s ideas about “displacement of goals”.
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Finally Carbone, following Mica (2018), provides another example of reasons for
permitting unintended consequences. Instead of assuming that policymakers produce
unintended consequences because they are ignorant or naïve, he argues that actors
permit consequences (foreseen and unforeseen) because they consider them a window
of opportunity and are skilled in reacting to them. Carbone details the unintended
eﬀects of older trade policy agreements on the more recent EU relations with the
African, Caribbean, and Paciﬁc (ACP) Group of states as an example. The unintended
eﬀects, he argues, were “purposively triggered”, that is, they were permitted in the hope
they would spill over.
Conclusions and prospects
What lessons have we learned from this Special Issue? We see that the distinction
between anticipated and unintended consequences can increase our ability to explain
and account for policy developments by bringing to the fore the trade-oﬀs that were
made in producing and permitting certain eﬀects. For a variety of policies that fall
under the umbrella of EU external action, this volume shows how this can be done. Its
contributions consistently ask “who anticipated what?” and thus open the black box of
“impact” by reintroducing agency, a valuable contribution to the literature.
Given the characteristics of the EU, such as multilevel governance and the complex-
ity of decision-making procedures, this does not mean that we can now simply hold
actors responsible for unwelcome consequences. However, attempts to trace anticipa-
tion discourage the “presumed ignorance” that the conventional use of unintended
consequences entails. Moreover, by explaining the occurrence of unintended conse-
quences – that is by systematically addressing the why question as Burlyuk and
Noutcheva stress in the Introduction − the studies in this volume contribute to
mapping out mechanisms or regularities that seem to further the production of unin-
tended but anticipated consequences. Such mechanisms could be the focus of research
for EU scholars who want to explore this issue further. This research agenda seeks
better explanation and, with that, a clear link to policy advice. After all, knowledge of
mechanisms that promote the occurrence of unintended but anticipated consequences
should help expose and control ethically questionable policy trade-oﬀs.
Another theme that emerges from this Special Issue which may inspire future
research is the diﬀerence between policy ﬁelds. The editors brought together policy
ﬁelds that are usually studied separately − for instance, economic and security issues.
From the various contributions, it appears that policymakers in these ﬁelds assess risks
diﬀerently and therefore make diﬀerent trade-oﬀs. The case of the TTIP, for instance,
shows the European Commission prepared to risk politicisation, an unwelcome and
unintended consequence, because it expects − or hopes – that the economic rewards of
an agreement with the United States will be enormous. In contrast, in the Western
Balkans the EU does not take risks. Here it prioritizes political stability over democracy
and rule of law, and thus promotes non-democratic outcomes. The EU permits this
unintended consequence because risk analysis suggests that, given overall interests, this
trade-oﬀ is the lesser evil (Webb 2018). Future studies on these topics would probably
beneﬁt from connecting literature on risk management (which has recently gained
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increasing attention from scholars in the ﬁeld of EU studies) with that on unintended
consequences.
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